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Abstract 
 
In this paper we analyze interrelations between ownership structures, corporate 
governance and investment in three transition countries: Russia, Ukraine and 
Kyrgyzstan. In contrast to most empirical papers on corporate governance, we study 
companies with very little exposure to public financial markets. Our empirical 
analysis is based on two years of data obtained through large-scale surveys of firms. 
Ukrainian companies appear to have the best corporate governance practices, while 
Russian companies – the worst. We find that the relationship between ownership 
concentration and corporate governance is non-linear. In Russia, the relationship 
between the share of the largest non-state shareholder and corporate governance is 
either positive or insignificant when the blockholder’s stake is below a certain 
threshold; however, a further increase in the blockholder’ share is associated with 
worsening corporate governance. We find a similar effect in Ukraine, but only for 
managerial ownership. In both countries, corporate governance improves as the 
combined share of small shareholders grows. No robust effects of the ownership 
structure are found for Kyrgyz firms. Further we show that the market for corporate 
control seems to have little relationship to the firms’ corporate governance practices. 
We find no link between the quality of corporate governance and either the need for 
outside finance or actual investments financed with outside funds in either of the three 
countries. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
It is well recognized by now that good corporate governance creates value. 
Studies by Gompers et al (2003), Durnev and Kim (2005), Black et al (2005), Black et 
al (2006a), Klapper and Love (2004) and several other papers show that in various 
countries better corporate governance is associated with a higher firm’s market value. 
Ultimately, sound corporate governance practices help channeling private sector funds 
into profitable projects and, thus, contribute to the economic development of a 
country (Claessens (2006)). While many of the economies of the former Soviet 
republics have been growing relatively fast over the last years, they still have a long 
way to go to catch up with the OECD countries. One of the likely impediments to 
growth in these countries is poor corporate governance. Therefore, it is important to 
understand where the incentives of managers and controlling owners to adhere to high 
corporate governance standards can come from and what should be done to improve 
these incentives. 
Theoretically, one of the main incentives to establish good corporate governance 
practices is the need for outside finance. Corporate governance helps establish 
commitment mechanisms that ensure adequate return for outside investors (Shleifer 
and Vishny 1997) and, hence, lowers the cost of outside finance for a firm. Chen et al 
(2004) and Skaife et al (2004) provide evidence that better governance reduces the 
cost of equity capital. Sengupta (1998) and Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) find that 
better corporate governance is associated with a lower cost of debt capital. 
Most theorists and practitioners agree that improving the quality of corporate 
governance and increasing transparency would help firms in CIS countries to attract 
outside finance and would eventually accelerate the development of CIS economies. 
Unsurprisingly, corporate governance has recently become one of the widely debated 
issues in Russia and other CIS countries. However, there has been no solid empirical 
evidence that firms with better corporate governance in transition countries are indeed 
more successful in attracting outside finance. 
Firms in transition economies are characterized by high degree of ownership 
concentration. Empirical studies suggest that ownership concentration is related to 
firms’ corporate governance, financing and investment policies. In a sample of firms 
from 27 mostly developing and transition economies, Durnev and Kim (2005) find a 
positive association between ownership concentration and corporate governance. 
Guriev et al (2003) find a similar effect for Russia. Filatotchev et al. (2001) show on a 
sample of Russian firms that ownership concentration is negatively related to 
investment. Filatotchev et al. (2007) demonstrate for a sample of Hungarian and 
Polish firms a hump-shaped relationship between ownership concentration and the 
management’s expectations of relying on public equity finance. 
In this paper we study the relationship between firms’ ownership structures, 
outside investment and the quality of corporate governance in three countries: Russia, 
Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. While these countries feature a number of similarities in 
terms of institutional environment, economic and financial market development, and 
ownership structures of companies, there are also important differences in the 
structure of economy, initial conditions and in the speed and design of reforms during 
transition period.  
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With notable exceptions5, there is a lack of empirical research on corporate 
governance in these countries. Our first goal is to assess the quality of corporate 
governance in the three countries, examine its dynamics and do cross country 
comparisons of corporate governance practices. Our second goal is to establish firm-
specific determinants of corporate governance, with a special attention to the effects 
of the ownership structure and the need for outside funds. Our third goal is to estimate 
whether corporate governance has an impact on the actual investment financed with 
outside funds (what we will call outside investment in the paper). 
Most of the international research on corporate governance has focused on large 
publicly traded firms with readily available data on market values. Relative openness 
of listed firms allows obtaining financial and ownership data that are more reliable 
than those of non-listed companies. In contrast to this literature, our paper focuses 
mainly on the non-listed firms. In transition economies, ownership structures of such 
firms are often obscure, financial data are unreliable and information on corporate 
governance practices is publicly unavailable. Therefore, we have collected our data 
through surveys and interviews of top managers6. The data was collected through mail 
surveys among Russian and Ukrainian enterprises and face-to-face interviews in 
Kyrgyzstan in years 2005 and 2006. As a result, we obtained two years of data on 
ownership, investment and corporate governance practices in the sample firms. 
We find that firms in all three countries are characterized by high ownership 
concentration in the hands of managers and large outside shareholders. Outside 
blockholders seem more powerful in Russia and Ukraine, while managers are more 
powerful in Kyrgyzstan. Controlling for the firm size, we found that Ukrainian 
companies have the best corporate governance practices, while Russian companies – 
the worst. We did not find any significant changes in either corporate governance 
practices or ownership structures over the year between the two rounds of the surveys. 
Our second main result is that corporate governance is related to firms’ 
ownership structures in Russia and Ukraine, but not in Kyrgyzstan. The form of this 
relationship is non-monotonic and qualitatively different in Russia and Ukraine. In 
Russia, the relationship between the share of the largest non-state shareholder and the 
quality  of the corporate governance is either positive or insignificant when the 
blockholder’s stake is below a certain threshold; however, a further increase in the 
blockholder’ share is associated with worsening corporate governance. We find a 
similar effect in Ukraine, but only for managerial ownership: corporate governance 
improves until the managers’ stake reaches roughly 50%, and then falls. In both 
countries, corporate governance improves as the combined share of small 
shareholders grows. No robust effects of the ownership structure are found for Kyrgyz 
firms. 
The link between ownership and corporate governance is not well understood by 
economists. On the one hand, higher ownership concentration creates incentives for 
the principal owner to increase firm value, which may induce him to practice good 
governance. On the other hand, greater accumulation of control allows the controlling 
shareholder ignore the rights of minority shareholders and eliminates pressures of the 
market for corporate control. Another possible reason why higher ownership 
concentration may lead to worse corporate governance is that the two may be 
substitutes: a large stake of a controlling shareholder signals his commitment to the 
                                                 
5 Black et al (2005), Guriev et al (2003), IFC(2005) 
6 The data was collected in the framework of INTAS research project. The project was undertaken by a 
group of experts from several research centers: CEFIR (Moscow), CASE-Poland, CASE-Kyrgyzstan, 
IET (Moscow) and STCSR (Kiev).  
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shareholder value maximization, implying less need for corporate governance 
mechanisms. The combination of these (and possibly other) factors may potentially 
lead to a non-monotonic link between ownership concentration and corporate 
governance. A separate problem is that ownership structure may be endogenous and 
may itself depend on the firm’s corporate governance. 
The differences in the relationship between ownership structure and corporate 
governance that we find across the three countries are probably related to the 
differences in the legal framework and institutional environment in these countries 
(Pistor et al. 2000) and are a subject of further research. 
One of the reasons, why managers and major shareholders may practice good 
corporate governance is a discipline imposed by the market for corporate control. In 
our surveys we collected data on takeovers, takeover attempts and threats in Russia 
and Kyrgyzstan (restrictions on the questionnaire size did not allow us to collect this 
information for Ukraine). We did not find any robust evidence that hostile takeovers 
have a discipline effect in the two countries: neither improvements in corporate 
governance lead to fewer takeover threats, nor takeover threats lead to subsequent 
improvements in corporate governance. 
The absence of a relationship between the market for corporate control and 
corporate governance may be explained by high ownership concentration, 
underdeveloped capital markets and weak legal environment. Controlling 
shareholders having stakes above 50% are effectively immune to a hostile acquisition 
through stock purchases, which reduces incentives to treat minority shareholders well. 
Moreover, underdeveloped capital markets make financing acquisitions more 
difficult. Finally, weak legal environment gave rise to a variety of “grey” and “black” 
takeover schemes, based on illegal or pseudo-legal means. Good corporate 
governance may be of little help to prevent such takeovers. 
Our third main result is that, contrary to many existing studies, corporate 
governance seems to be unrelated to investment in any of the three countries.8 Neither 
need for external funds leads to improvements in corporate governance nor better 
corporate governance results in more externally financed investment. The absence of 
a link between corporate governance and outside investment can be explained by 
underdeveloped public capital markets and weak legal enforcement. The latter 
undermines the credibility of corporate governance mechanisms and also makes 
transparent firms vulnerable to expropriation by private raiders and the state. As a 
result, good corporate governance practices both fail to lower the cost of outside funds 
and may create additional costs related to the insecurity of property rights. Thus, for 
most firms, it does not pay to practice good corporate governance even if they have a 
need for outside investment. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the 
methodology of our surveys and structure of samples obtained. Section 3 briefly looks 
at the managers’ perception of the goals of corporate governance. In Section 4 we 
provide a descriptive analysis of corporate governance practices in the three countries. 
Finally, Section 5 presents a regression analysis of the determinants of the corporate 
governance and the link between governance and outside investments. 
 
2. DATA 
                                                 
8 A number of empirical studies find a positive effect of investment opportunities and need for outside 
finance on corporate governance: see e.g. Durnev and Kim (2005), Black et al (2006b) 
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2.1. Methodology of data collection 
 
The data on ownership, corporate governance practices and investment was 
collected through mail surveys in Russia and Ukraine and face-to-face interviews in 
Kyrgyzstan in two rounds in years 2005 and 2006. We also used official statistics to 
obtain data on employment, industry and region.  
Reliance on surveys rather than official statistics is predetermined by limitations 
on the availability of data due to the countries’ economic and institutional 
environment as well as by the nature of our sample, consisting largely of closely-held 
companies. Non-transparency of ownership structures and the widespread use of 
nominal owners render official ownership data uninformative. Financial data, 
especially those based on local accounting standards are generally unreliable, while 
the information on corporate governance practices is often impossible to obtain but by 
asking managers of a company directly. 
The cost of using survey data is a risk of biased responses or absence of 
responses to sensitive questions. However, first of all, all survey respondents were 
guaranteed confidentiality of the information provided by them. Secondly, in Russia 
and Ukraine, the same panel of firms was regularly surveyed on various issues for 
more than ten years. That allowed establishing confidential relations between firms 
and the institutions conducting the surveys over these years. 
In Russia the surveys were conducted by the Business Surveys Laboratory of the 
Institute for the Economy in Transition (IET). IET has developed and maintained a 
panel of top managers of about 1200 industrial enterprises as part of monthly business 
surveys, which have been conducted since 1992 with the methodological support of 
the European Commission, Eurostat and OECD. The panel covers all regions and 
sectors of Russian industrial sector. The panel includes mainly medium and large 
enterprises. The majority of respondents to regular business surveys are high level 
managers. The rate of response to surveys has been about 800-900 firms (65-70%), 
which is exceptionally high for enterprise surveys in Russia and is due to established 
long-term connections with firms. Based on this panel, in 2002 and 2003, IET and 
CEFIR conducted the surveys on the demand for modern standards of corporate 
governance (see Guriev et al. 2003). The methodology developed for that study 
served as a basis for developing the methodology for our paper. 
In Ukraine the surveys were conducted by The Scientific Technical Complex of 
Statistical Research (STCSR). STCSR has conducted regular business surveys since 
1996 using European harmonized methodology. The surveys of industrial, 
construction, transport, agricultural, and other enterprises are conducted. The surveys 
are conducted on quarterly basis, using a consistent panel of respondents constructed 
separately for different sectors of economy. The industrial enterprises panel consists 
of 1800 enterprises and includes virtually all the large industrial firms and most of the 
medium-sized firms. The response rate has been usually 85-90%, which is even 
higher than in Russia. 
In Kyrgyzstan the surveys were conducted by the Center for Social and 
Economic Research – Kyrgyzstan (CASE-Kyrgyzstan). Due to the absence of a panel 
of firms, such as those maintained in Russia and Ukraine, in Kyrgyzstan the surveys 
were carried out using a different methodology. Kyrgyzstan is a small country with a 
small economy. The total number of industrial enterprises is about 450, out of which 
about 300 are privatized companies (the rest are state-owned enterprises and de novo 
firms). Thus, the Kyrgyz sample includes all sectors of industry in all 8 regions of the 
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country. Given the relatively small number of firms, it was possible to conduct the 
survey via face-to-face interviews with the help of a survey firm with an excellent 
track record in this field.  
 
2.2. Sample description 
 
Our sample is based on two rounds of surveys and interviews, conducted in 
2005 and 2006 in Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Ukraine according to the methodology 
described above. In each round we received responses from around 1100-1200 
Ukrainian, 1000 Russian and 300 Kyrgyz companies. Roughly 75%-90% of the first 
round respondents participated in the second round as well. 
Figures 1a and 1b in the appendix give an idea of the size distribution of 
companies in the sample. Most of the companies are medium or large size enterprises, 
but not very large. Though Russian firms are somewhat bigger than Ukrainian ones 
and substantially bigger than Kyrgyz ones, this difference should be attributed to the 
natural difference in the size of companies in the countries’ industries. Thus, the 
samples are equally representative. 
Table 1 gives further information on the types of firms in the sample. Less than 
15% of enterprises in each country’s sample are listed. This distinguishes our study 
from most of the corporate governance empirical literature which focuses on listed 
firms. A majority of the firms are open joint-stock companies (OAO)9. Most firms are 
not parts of business groups, although in Russia almost third of surveyed firms are 
members of business groups. We control for the form of incorporation and group 
membership in our empirical analysis as these variables are likely to affect corporate 
governance practices. 
 Tables 2a and 2b display the average ownership structure in the three countries. 
All countries exhibit substantial concentration of ownership in firms. Average stake of 
the largest blockholder in a firm (it can be manager, outsider or state) is above 50% in 
all three countries; highest ownership concentration is observed in Kyrgyzstan. 
Outside blockholders seem to be more powerful in Russia and Ukraine, while 
manager-owners are more powerful in Kyrgyzstan. This can be explained by the 
difference in the sizes of firms, and Figures 2a-2c provide support for that. In all three 
countries the management’s share falls with firm size, while the largest outsider’s 
share either rises with firm size (in Russia and Ukraine) or exhibits no clear trend (in 
Kyrgyzstan). Small shareholders jointly have on average less than 25% of shares in all 
three countries. 
Another observation from Table 2a is that average ownership structures seem 
rather stable: they have not changed much over the year between the rounds of the 
survey in any country. Previous studies have shown that ownership concentration in 
Russia has been steadily growing since the mass privatization in early 90s (Biletskiy 
et al (2001), Dolgopyatova (2003), IFC(2005)). It is possible that the average 
ownership structure has stabilized over recent years.  
 
                                                 
9 Corporate law in the three countries has provisions for two types of joint stock companies. An open 
joint stock company doesn’t have limitations on the number of shareholders, and shareholders can trade 
their shares freely. A closed joint stock company has limitations on the number of shareholders (not 
more than 50 in Russia and Kyrgyzstan) and doesn’t allow shareholders to sell their shares freely – 
other shareholders in the company have preemptive rights on buying shares. A closed joint stock 
company cannot list its shares on a stock exchange. 
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3. COMPANIES’ PERCEPTION OF GOALS AND PROBLEMS OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
Before moving to the analysis of the corporate governance practices, it is useful 
to get an idea of what managers themselves think about the goals and the problems of 
corporate governance. Tables 3 and 4 summarize managers’ responses to these 
questions. 
Regarding the goals, we should keep in mind that the question the respondents 
were asked was about the goals that corporate governance actually serves achieving in 
their companies, not about any hypothetical goals or goals that corporate governance 
should serve ideally. “Raising the effectiveness of the decision-making process” is the 
most frequently mentioned goal of corporate governance in all three countries. On the 
contrary, “facilitating access to capital markets” and “prevention and (or) resolution 
of corporate conflicts” – the reasons that the theory predicts to be crucial – are at the 
bottom of the list. Another frequently mentioned goal of corporate governance is 
“raising the company’s reputation”. However, reputation itself is useless unless it is 
capitalized in e.g. better terms of raising outside finance or more trustworthy 
relationships with business counterparties or employees. Since access to capital 
markets is not considered a goal of corporate governance in most companies, the latter 
interpretation of the role of reputation seems more plausible. 
The discrepancy between the theoretical view and the managers’ perceptions 
may be explained in two ways. First, managers may have a different from corporate 
governance scholars idea of what corporate governance is. Second, in a weak 
institutional and economic environment, corporate governance may indeed be of low 
importance for access to capital markets and resolution of corporate conflicts in most 
firms.10 Our empirical analysis in section 5 supports the latter conjecture as we find 
almost no link between corporate governance and outside investment.  
Another interesting observation from Table 3 is a high frequency of mentioning 
compliance with the law among the goals of corporate governance. This implies that 
many managers see no gains from raising the corporate governance standards above 
the level required by the law. 
Closely related to the question about goals is the question about problems of 
corporate governance (Table 4). Here the respondents tend to indicate country-wide 
problems. Inadequacy of legislation is considered the main problem by respondents in 
all countries, but its importance is especially high in Ukraine. Weak minority 
shareholder protection is also very important in all countries, while poor quality of 
judicial system is considerably important only in Russia and Kyrgyzstan. These 
results give an idea on which aspects of the legal system reforms in each country 
should focus. 
 
4. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES IN FIRMS 
 
To assess the quality of corporate governance in companies we asked various 
questions about corporate governance, concerning shareholder rights, board 
composition, transparency and disclosure. Table 5 contains the most important 
                                                 
10 This does not mean, however, that corporate governance is useless for attracting outside finance for 
any firm. It is very likely to matter for the largest listed companies that are exposed to public capital 
markets (especially international ones). The study Black et al (2005) found a strong link between 
corporate governance and market valuations of the largest Russian firms, which should have an 
implication for their ability to raise outside finance. 
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corporate governance questions and summarizes the results for the two years of the 
survey. 
A quick look at the table gives an impression that Ukraine has the best corporate 
governance practices, while Kyrgyzstan – the worst. However, if we control for the 
firm size, Russia becomes the worst, as we will see later. Per unit costs of corporate 
governance are likely to be lower at larger companies, hence the larger the size, the 
higher the probability that the company has adopted good corporate governance 
practices. 
Apart from the firm characteristics the observed differences in corporate 
governance practices may be caused by the different requirement of corporate law in 
three countries. Table 6 provides some information about the norms of corporate law 
in the three countries with respect to the issues listed in Table 5. Interactions between 
these legal requirements and firms’ characteristics, such as the ownership structure, 
may produce the observed differences in corporate governance practices. For 
example, Russian corporate law is more favorable to minority shareholders than 
Kyrgyz law as it requires cumulative voting for board members, which gives more 
power to minority shareholders. However, much fewer firms in Russia have minority 
shareholders’ representatives on the board, in spite of the fact that a higher share of 
firms has minority owners in Russian sample (about 80%, same in Ukraine) than in 
Kyrgyz sample (about 70%). A higher average combined stake of small shareholders 
in Kyrgyz firms compared to Russian firms may be a part of the explanation. 
Different levels of law enforcement and compliance with the law may also contribute 
to the observed differences.  
Another conclusion arising from Table 5 is that corporate governance practices 
did not change much from 2005 to 2006. This is likely to be related to the fact that the 
average ownership structure in the three countries did not change over this period, 
and, as we will show in section 5, ownership structure is one of the main determinants 
of corporate governance.  
In order to develop a single measure of the quality of corporate governance, we 
constructed a scalar index of corporate governance, adopting the approach of Guriev 
et al (2003). Our main index aggregates answers to the six questions, highlighted in 
bold in Table 5. The choice of these particular questions was due to our desire to 
achieve a good balance between aggregating as much information about various 
aspects of corporate governance as possible and keeping the number of observations 
large enough, as there are some missing values in the answers. We tried adding more 
questions as well as different combinations of questions, but such modifications 
significantly reduce the number of observations. 
To construct the main index we assigned value 1 to an answer if it was “yes”, 
and 0 if it was “no”. Firms with a missing answer to any of the six questions were 
excluded. We used two different ways of aggregating answers: simple sum and the 
first principle component. By CGI we denote the index based on a simple sum of 
answers, while CGI_pc1 is the first principle component. The two indices are not very 
different in fact – the correlation between them ranges from 0.94 and 0.98 depending 
on the country and the year. We report our results only for CGI, though we also use 
CGI_pc1 to check for the robustness of the results – they remain essentially the same. 
As Figure 3 shows, all three countries exhibit a rather large variation in 
corporate governance practices that the firms follow. The mean value of CGI is 
highest for Ukraine and lowest for Russia; the difference in the mean values between 
Russia and the other two countries is statistically significant while the difference 
between Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine is not. At the same time the median index value is 
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the same for Russia and Kyrgyzstan (3 points) and higher for Ukraine (4 points). It 
means that in Russian sample there a smaller percentage firms have very good 
governance score, which is obvious from the graph. 
As we mentioned before, it is important to adjust these differences for firm size. 
Figure 4 demonstrates that in all three countries, larger firms are more likely to adopt 
the norms of good governance. Interestingly, for the very large firms (more than 5000 
employees) country matters less: their corporate governance practices are similar 
irrespective of the country (here we can only compare Russia and Ukraine as 
Kyrgyzstan does not have really large companies). 
In addition to the aggregate index of corporate governance, we also use two 
other indices in our regression analysis: shareholder rights index (SRI) and 
transparency and disclosure index (TDI). The first index is essentially a sub-index of 
CGI, taking into account only answers to the questions about the shareholder 
department, supplying agenda of the general shareholder meeting, independent 
registrar and the representatives of minority shareholders on the board, as those 
questions that reflect the strength of shareholder rights in a company. The second 
index aggregates answers to the question about international accounting standards 
and three additional questions: whether a company’s annual reports are audited by an 
independent auditor, whether a company discloses annual financial reports, and 
whether a company discloses all its beneficial owners. The answers to these questions 
bear the basic information about transparency and the disclosure practices of a 
company. While SRI is highly correlated with CGI (the correlation coefficient ranges 
from 0.83 to 0.93 depending on the country and the year), TDI is much less correlated 
with CGI (the correlation coefficient ranges from 0.28 to 0.7). 
 
5. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
5.1. Determinants of corporate governance. 
 
To analyze the determinants of corporate governance we run a series of 
regressions in which we regress our corporate governance indices on a number of 
variables, including size, legal form, ownership structure, outside investment needs, 
industry, etc. We focus on running separate regressions for each country. The reason 
we prefer not to pool all three countries is that the relationships between firm-specific 
variables and corporate governance may differ qualitatively among them, and one of 
our goals was indeed to capture such differences. Nevertheless, For Russia and 
Ukraine we ran regressions on the pooled sample with a country dummy (we did not 
include Kyrgyz firms in the pool as they are substantially smaller in size). As 
expected, the pooled regressions showed that, controlling for firm- and industry-
specific variables, Ukrainian firms have better corporate governance than their 
Russian counterparts, with a Ukrainian dummy positive and significant at 1% level 
(not reported). 
First, for each country, we run simple OLS regressions on each year of data. The 
dependent variable is CGI. We also present the results for SRI and TDI indices. Tables 
7a-7c present the results for year 2006 with the same year regressors (the results for 
2005 are generally similar).  
Importantly, there arises an endogeneity problem when we try to estimate the 
effects of firm characteristics on its corporate governance practices. In particular, 
there is likely to be a reverse causality in the relationship between corporate 
governance and ownership structure: corporate governance may affect changes in 
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ownership. In attempt to at least partially deal with this problem we also run 
regressions of corporate governance in 2006 on firm characteristics in 2005. Tables 
8a-8c present the results with lagged regressors. 
The regressions’ results confirm the positive effect of size in all three countries, 
discussed earlier. Open joint-stock companies (OAO) practice better corporate 
governance than other business forms (mainly closed joint-stock companies). Listing 
is also associated with better governance practices, though this effect is mostly 
insignificant in Ukraine and Russia. Most likely, listing can only matter when a 
company gets listed either in the highest tiers of local stock exchanges or abroad: even 
if we have such companies in our sample they are likely to be very few. Business 
group membership is insignificant in all three countries. 
Our special interest is devoted to the relationship between corporate governance 
and outside investment (i.e. investment financed with outside funds). Theoretically, 
greater need for outside funds should make firms improve their corporate governance 
practices in order to attract outside investors This result has been also obtained 
empirically in a number of papers (e.g. Durnev and Kim (2005), Black et al (2006b)). 
At the same time, better corporate governance reduces the cost of outside funds and, 
hence, should result in more externally-financed investment. We test for the latter in 
the next subsection. Here we examine whether a need for outside finance is associated 
with better corporate governance. 
We have two proxies for the need for outside finance. First, funds_need is a 
direct answer to the question whether a firm has plans to attract outside finance in the 
next 3 years. It equals 1 if the answer is yes, and 0 if the answer is no. Second, we use 
the loan_need variable. It equals 1 if the respondent said the firm was ready to raise a 
long-term bank loan at the interest rate of 3% or higher and 0 if there was no need for 
a bank loan. 
Need for outside finance, as proxied by loan_need, turned out to be statistically 
insignificant in all countries except in a few specifications in Russia. When we use 
funds_need, the results remain qualitatively the same. Hence, it appears that the need 
for outside finance does not induce firms to practice better corporate governance in 
either country. We postpone the discussion of this result to the next section. 
The most interesting results concern the effects of the ownership structure on 
corporate governance. A greater aggregate share of small (each owning less than 5% 
of a firm) shareholders is associated with better corporate governance in Russia and 
Ukraine, but its effect is insignificant in Kyrgyzstan. The same positive effect was 
obtained by Guriev et al (2003) for Russia. 
The largest non-government shareholder’s share seems to have a non-linear 
effect in Russia and Ukraine, though its effect is mostly insignificant in the latter 
country. Initially, ownership concentration in the hands of the largest private 
shareholder improves corporate governance. However, after it reaches 40-45%, its 
further increase is associated with a fall in the corporate governance quality. In 
Kyrgyzstan, we did not find any statistically significant link between the share of the 
largest private owner and corporate governance. 
How does the government’s ownership affect corporate governance? We found 
a hump-shaped association between the government’s share and corporate governance 
in Russia, though this effect disappears once we use lagged regressors. The share after 
which corporate governance starts deteriorating is around 30%. In Ukraine, 
government ownership seems to have no effect, while in Kyrgyzstan it only has an 
effect on transparency and disclosure. The latter effect has a U-shape (rather than a 
hump-shape), with the point of minimum around 50-80%. 
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Different types of large private shareholders can have a different effect on 
corporate governance. To capture these possible differences, we additionally run the 
same set of regressions, but treating the managers’ share and the largest outside 
shareholder’s share separately. 
We found no link between the managers’ share and corporate governance in 
Russia. In Ukraine the effect of the managers’ ownership is similar to the effect of the 
largest private owner’s share that we obtained without distinguishing between 
managers and outside blockholders, i.e. hump-shaped with the point of maximum 
around 50%. In Kyrgyzstan, in contrast, relationship between managerial ownership 
and corporate governance is U-shaped (rather than hump-shaped). However, this 
effect disappears once we use lagged regressors (Table 8c). 
The largest outsider’s share is generally negatively associated with corporate 
governance in Russia, though the effect seems non-linear concave. It becomes 
insignificant when we use lagged regressors. In contrast, Ukrainian firms exhibit no 
statistically significant relationship between the largest outsider’s share and corporate 
governance. We found some evidence of a negative concave effect of the largest 
outsider’s share on corporate governance in Kyrgyzstan, though the effect disappears 
when we use lagged regressors (Table 8c). 
Let us summarize the results on the links between the ownership structure and 
corporate governance. In Russia, private blockholders seem to have the main impact 
on corporate governance. The effect is non-linear concave: the best corporate 
governance is observed when blockholder accumulates almost controlling stake and it 
deteriorates with further ownership concentration. In Ukrainian firms, the effect 
differs between the two types of private blockholders: outside blockholders do not 
seem to matter, while the managerial ownership has a hump-shaped effect on 
corporate governance, with corporate governance improving until the share reaches 
50% and deteriorating afterwards. In Kyrgyzstan, the effects of the two types of the 
largest private owners seem weak. Greater aggregate share of small shareholders is 
associated with better corporate governance practices in Russia and Ukraine. 
The link between ownership and corporate governance is not well understood by 
economists. On the one hand, higher ownership concentration creates incentives for 
the principal owner increase firm value, which may induce him to practice good 
governance. On the other hand, greater accumulation of control allows ignoring the 
rights of minority shareholders. Another possible reason why higher ownership 
concentration may lead to worse corporate governance is that the two may be 
substitutes: a large enough stake of a controlling shareholder signals his commitment 
to the shareholder value maximization, implying less need for formal corporate 
governance mechanisms. The combination of these (and possibly other) factors may 
potentially lead to a non-monotonic link between ownership concentration and 
corporate governance. 
At the same time, it is difficult to say why the relationship between ownership 
and corporate governance is so different across the countries. The differences may be 
related to the differences in the legal framework and institutional environment in these 
countries; analyzing effects of these factors is a subject for future research. 
To further address the endogoeneity problem, we regress changes in corporate 
governance on changes in ownership and need for outside funds. Tables 9a-9c show 
the results of the regressions for all three countries. We obtain very few statistically 
significant results here. The problem here is that the variation in the data is very small 
as corporate governance and ownership as well as other firm characteristics have 
changed very little during the year. In Russia, an increase in the largest outsider’s 
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share is associated with a decrease in the quality of corporate governance in some 
specifications. This is consistent with the already mentioned negative impact of large 
outside blockholders in Russia. The need for loan is insignificant everywhere, except 
the positive effect on TDI in Kyrgyzstan. The results do not change qualitatively if we 
use funds_need instead.  
 
5.2. Effect of corporate governance on investment 
 
In the previous subsection we did not find any link between the need for outside 
funds and corporate governance. In this subsection we test whether better corporate 
governance leads to more actual outside investment. The common argument why it 
should be the case is that good corporate governance lowers the cost of outside funds 
for a firm. 
To construct our investment variable we use the answer to the question about 
actual last year investment sources, asked in 2006. Hence, answers to this question 
refer to 2005. Variable invest_sources takes value 0 if the firm did not do any 
investments last year, 1 if the investments were made only from the internal funds, 
and 2 if outside funds were attracted for investments. Table 10 provides statistics on 
the investment strategies of firms in the three countries. Lowest investment rates are 
observed in Kyrgyzstan. Among investing firms the majority of firms invest only 
from internal sources. Almost a third of companies in Russia attract some outside 
investment (mostly bank loans), the quarter of firms do so in Ukraine and only 14% - 
in Kyrgyzstan. 
We regress the investment variable on corporate governance measures, 
controlling for ownership, and other variables measured in 2005. The results of the 
multinomial logit regressions are presented in Tables 10a-10c in the appendix. The 
coefficients at various corporate governance measures turned out to be insignificant 
for all three countries11. Unsurprisingly, the need for outside funds (loan_need) 
positively affects the probability of outside investment: the effect is particularly 
statistically significant in Russia and Ukraine. The ownership variables turned out 
insignificant in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, but not in Russia. In Russia, government 
ownership has a statistically significant U-shaped effect on outside investment, with 
the point of minimum around 50%. Given that very few companies in the sample have 
government shares above 50%, the effect is negative in our sample, albeit non-linear. 
Another interesting observation is that the combined share of all small (<5%) 
shareholders is negatively associated with outside investment in Russia. 
The effect of corporate governance on outside investment could be blurred due 
to the fact that our sample contains a lot of firms that did not actually have plans to 
attract outside finance. For such firms we should not observe any link between 
corporate governance and outside investment simply because they do not need outside 
investment. To circumvent this problem, we run the above regressions only for the 
firms that had plans to attract outside investment in 2005. All corporate governance 
                                                 
11 It is not obvious how one should model investment decisions of firms. Multinomial logit is one 
possibility. Another possibility is the Heckman selection model which implies that a firm first decides 
whether to invest and then chooses investment sources. One can also ignore the selection problem (in 
particular for Russia where the share of non-investing firms is small) and estimate binomial probit for 
the probability to use outside investments. We have estimated all these models and the results were 
robust across specifications: the effect of corporate governance on outside investment is insignificant in 
all three countries. We have also estimated the regressions only for open joint stock companies but the 
results didn’t change. 
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indicators remained statistically insignificant, except the marginally significant 
positive coefficient at transparency and disclosure variable in Russia (not reported). 
It might be the case that the relationship between corporate governance and 
investment is more pronounced for listed firms, as they are presumably more exposed 
to capital markets. However, restricting ourselves to only listed firms leaves us with 
very few observations for each country. 
Finally, we checked whether better corporate governance is associated with the 
lower cost of capital by regressing the maximum rate at which a firm agrees to borrow 
from a bank on corporate governance indicators. We did not find any statistically 
significant effect (not reported). 
To summarize the results on the link between corporate governance and 
investment, in contrast to what the theory would predict and a number of empirical 
paper find, we did not establish any link between corporate governance and either 
need for outside finance or actual outside investment in our samples. We put forward 
two explanations for such result: poor development of financial markets and weak 
legal environment, especially weak legal enforcement. 
The former directly impedes raising funds by making the cost of outside finance 
high even for firms with good corporate governance. The latter undermines the 
credibility of corporate governance mechanisms and also makes transparent firms 
vulnerable to expropriation by private raiders and the state. Thus, for most firms, it 
does not pay to practice good corporate governance even if they have a need for 
outside finance. Our explanation is consistent with the recent empirical findings of 
Doidge et al (2007), who established that country characteristics, such legal 
institutions and the level of economic and financial development, affect firms’ 
incentives for better governance. 
 
5.3. Corporate governance and the market for corporate control 
 
Hostile takeovers may lead to changes in corporate governance in two ways. 
First, there are direct ex-post effects of a change in control: new owners may change 
corporate governance practices in the firm (though it is not a priory clear in which 
direction). Second, there is an ex-ante effect of a threat of a takeover on the current 
management’s/controlling shareholder’ incentives to practice good corporate 
governance. This ex-ante effect is also unclear a priory. On the one hand, a takeover 
threat may induce the incumbent to improve corporate governance, thereby raising the 
value of the company and making selling to a raider a less attractive alternative for 
current shareholders (Guriev et al (2004)). On the other hand, a takeover threat may 
provoke a defensive tactics of decreasing transparency and concentrating control 
mechanisms in the hands of the principal owner/manager (Bebchuk (1999)). 
We focus on the ex-ante effects of hostile takeovers. Though we asked firms to 
provide information on actually occurred hostile takeovers, there are two problems 
associated with these data. First, if the management of a firm was changed between 
the two rounds of the survey (which should normally happen in the case of a hostile 
takeover), the second round respondent is likely to differ from the first round one. So, 
he may have an incentive to present the takeover as a friendly one, or simply conceal 
the fact of the takeover (we have very few cases of reported hostile takeovers in our 
data). He may also be reluctant to report truthfully new corporate governance 
practices in the firm in case they are worse than the past ones. Second, even if the 
information is reported truthfully in both rounds of the survey, a takeover may imply 
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a substantial overhaul of the company, which makes any short run comparisons of 
corporate governance practices meaningless. 
We asked questions about current takeover threats, failed takeover attempts in 
the last two years and cases of greenmail in the last two years. The dummy variables 
are respectively threat, attempt and greenmail. They take value 1 if the answer to the 
corresponding question was “yes”, and 0 if the answer was “no”. Unfortunately, due 
to restrictions on the questionnaire size, we did not ask these questions in Ukraine, so 
the analysis of this section is confined to Kyrgyzstan and Russia. 
We run two types of regressions. First, we check whether past takeover threats, 
attempts and greenmail cases lead to an improvement of corporate governance. 
Second, we check whether an improvement in corporate governance results in a lower 
likelihood of a takeover threat. 
Tables 11a-11c and 12a-12c show the regression results. Overall we do not find 
an evidence of any relationship between the market for corporate control and 
corporate governance, except the positive statistically significant at 1% effect of 
greenmail on improvements in transparency and disclosure in Kyrgyzstan. The latter 
effect is consistent with the discipline hypothesis of the market for corporate control. 
Due to a small number of observations, the results in Tables 12a-12c should be 
interpreted with caution. We think, however, that one result deserves attention: 
profitability in 2005 is negatively correlated with the change in takeover threats in 
Kyrgyzstan, and positively – in Russia. Both effects are statistically significant in 
most specifications. This difference together with the greenmail effect in Kyrgyzstan 
allows us to make a cautious conclusion that the market for corporate control may 
work rather differently in the two countries. Anecdotal evidence from Russia suggests 
that firms that raiders acquire are often not the badly governed ones but those that 
have attractive assets insufficiently protected against illegal or pseudo-legal takeover 
schemes. High profitability may indicate higher attractiveness of the assets and, 
hence, be correlated with takeover threats. While we know very little about hostile 
takeovers in Kyrgyzstan, the results suggest a different picture of the market for 
corporate control there. The finding that badly managed firms (i.e. with low 
profitability) are more likely to face threats, and that greenmail makes controlling 
owners improve corporate governance, indicates that the Kyrgyz market for corporate 
control provides some discipline and is targeted towards less efficient firms.  
In general, however, we found almost no link between corporate governance in 
takeovers in the three countries. Absence of such link may be explained by high 
ownership concentration, underdeveloped capital markets and weak legal 
environment. Controlling shareholders having stakes above 50% are effectively 
immune to a hostile acquisition through stock purchases, which reduces incentives to 
treat minority shareholders well. Moreover, underdeveloped capital markets make 
financing acquisitions more difficult. Finally, weak legal environment gave rise to a 
variety of “grey” and “black” takeover schemes, based on illegal or pseudo-legal 
means. Good corporate governance may be of little help to prevent such takeovers. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
In this work we have analyzed the interrelations between ownership structures, 
corporate governance and investment in three transition economies: Russia, Ukraine 
and Kyrgyzstan. Our analysis was devoted to companies that have little or no 
exposure to public financial markets. We have found that Ukrainian companies appear 
to have the best corporate governance practices, while Russian companies – the worst. 
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Ownership structure turned out to be an important determinant of corporate 
governance in Russia and Ukraine. At the same time, the effects of ownership 
concentration appeared to be non-linear and even non-monotonic. Contrary to what 
the theory predicts and a number of empirical papers have found, neither the need for 
outside finance nor the actual outside investment have any relationship to corporate 
governance in any of the three countries. Thus, ownership concentrations rather than 
the need for outside finance seem to affect corporate governance choices of firms. The 
market for corporate control was found to be ineffective in providing incentives for 
good governance. 
Our results suggest that strengthening law enforcement and promoting the 
development of financial markets are crucial for unleashing the benefits of good 
corporate governance practices in the three countries. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Figure 1a. Sample structure of Russian and Ukrainian firms by size in 2006 
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Figure 1b. Sample structure of Kyrgyz firms by size in 2006 
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Figure 2a. Ownership structure and firm size in 2006, Russia 
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Figure 2b. Ownership structure and firm size in 2006, Ukraine 
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Figure 2c. Ownership structure and firm size in 2006, Kyrgyzstan 
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Figure 3. Index of corporate governance (CGI) in 2006, histograms and sample 
means. 
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Note: CGI is computed on the basis of six questions highlighted in bold in Table 7. For each firm, a 
value of 1 was assigned to an answer if it was “yes” and 0 if it was “no”. The value of CGI for each 
firm was obtained by adding up the answers to all six questions. CGI takes values from 0 to 6. Only 
firms that have a board of directors were included in this graph. 
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Figure 4. Index of corporate governance (CGI) by firm size in 2006 
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Note: Only firms that have a board of directors were included in this graph. 
 
 
Table 1. Firms’ characteristics in 2006 (figures were similar in 2005) 
As a percentage of firms for which 
the data were available 
Legal form 
Russia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan 
Open joint-stock company (OAO) 74 69 66 
Closed joint-stock company (ZAO) 24 31 11 
Other 2 0 23 
Number of companies 981 1103 306 
As a percentage of respondents who 
answered this question 
Is your company a part of a 
business group? 
Russia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan 
Yes 31 18 11 
No 69 82 89 
Number of companies answered 981 780 306 
As a percentage of respondents who 
answered this question 
Is the company listed on a stock 
exchange? 
Russia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan 
Yes 7 14 9 
No 93 86 91 
Number of companies answered 569 710 286 
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Table 2a. Ownership structure in 2005 and 2006  
 
What actual 
percentage of shares in 
your firm do you think 
is owned by: 
Russia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan 
 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 
Largest blockholder: 59 61 61 
 
61 66 67 
Management 22 23 16 16 36 34 
Largest outside (non-
state) shareholder 
36 38 42 42 26 26 
Government 8 9 6 6 12 15 
All small (below 5%) 
shareholders 
21 18 23 22 21 20 
Number of companies 
answered 
566-619 595-621 549 587 242 254 
 
Table 2b. Identity of the largest owner in 2006 
As a percentage of respondents who 
answered this questionnaire 
What is the type of the largest outside 
shareholder in your company? 
Russia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan
Domestic individual 42 34 55 
Domestic legal entity 56 48 25 
Foreign individual 1 4 8 
Foreign legal entity 4 16 12 
Number of companies answered 588 551 215 
 
 
Table 3. Respondents’ perception of the goals of corporate governance in 2006 
(figures were similar in 2005) 
As a percentage of respondents 
who answered this question 
Which goals in your opinion corporate 
governance serves achieving in your company? 
Russia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan 
Raising the effectiveness of the decision making 
process 66 66 62 
Facilitating access to domestic and international 
capital markets 10 10 32 
Raising company’s reputation 44 25 51 
Prevention and (or) resolution of corporate 
conflicts 14 11 16 
Conducting business in compliance with the law 41 42 38 
Other 2 1 2 
Corporate governance does not serve achieving 
any goals in our company 8 8 11 
Number of companies answered 672 693 199 
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Table 4. Respondents’ perception of the most sensitive problems of corporate 
governance in their country in 2006 (figures were similar in 2005) 
As a percentage of respondents 
who answered this question 
Which corporate governance problems do you 
think are currently the most sensitive in 
Russian industry? Russia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan 
weak protection of small shareholders 37 30 41 
weak protection of large shareholders 10 4 17 
insufficient control over managers’ operation 19 4 16 
failure by companies to meet information 
disclosure requirements 9 2 9 
inadequate competence of the members of the 
board of directors 14 3 15 
inadequate protection of creditor rights 8 6 10 
inadequacy of current legislation (laws on 
companies, on bankruptcies, etc.) 39 58 48 
weakness of the judicial system in settling 
corporate disputes 25 14 26 
other corporate governance problems 6 9 8 
main problems of Russian/Ukrainian/Kygryz 
industry go beyond corporate governance 39 35 9 
Number of companies answered 664 666 190 
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Table 5. Corporate governance practices of companies 
Percentage of “yes” answers in the sample of respondents who 
answered the corresponding question 
Russia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan 
Corporate governance 
practices (shareholder 
rights and board structure) 
2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 
Do you have a shareholders 
department? 40 35 36 34 17 23 
Do you supply agenda of 
general shareholders 
meeting to all of your 
shareholders? 
88 80 96 96 88 77 
Is your shareholders’ 
register maintained by an 
independent registrar? 
79 74 90 90 69 63 
Are there independent 
directors on the board of 
directors of your company? 
46 43 56 55 27 25 
Are there representatives of 
minority shareholders on 
the board of directors? 
29 24 61 60 49 43 
Are there formal committees 
(audit, remuneration, 
nomination) on your board of 
directors? 
9 7 16 18 5 6 
Do you use international 
accounting standards (US 
GAAP/IAS)? 
9 9 31 30 49 61 
Are your annual reports 
audited by an independent 
auditor? 
93 91 95 99 71 75 
Number of companies 
answered 562-720 654-721 667-915 534-859 252-291 281-298 
Note: Questions highlighted in bold were used in the creation of the Corporate Governance Index 
(CGI). For the questions concerning board practices, calculations were made on the sample of firms 
that have a board directors. 
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Table 6. Provisions in the company law in three countries 
 
 Russia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan 
    
Shareholders department Not mandatory NA Not mandatory 
Provision of an agenda of 
general shareholders 
meeting to all 
shareholders 
Mandatory  Mandatory 
Independent registrar In companies with 
more than 50 
shareholders register 
should be maintained 
by independent 
registrar 
NA In all open joint 
stock companies 
register should be 
maintained by 
independent 
registrar 
Presence of the board Not mandatory for the 
companies with less 
than 50 shareholders 
NA Not mandatory 
Independent directors  Not mandatory; 
Law on JSC contains 
definition of 
independent director 
NA Not mandatory;  
Law on JSC doesn’t 
contain definition 
of independent 
director 
Representatives of 
minority shareholders on 
the board of directors 
Cumulative voting for 
board members 
NA No cumulative 
voting 
Formal committees (audit, 
remuneration, nomination) 
on the board of directors 
Not mandatory NA Not mandatory 
International accounting 
standards (US 
GAAP/IAS) 
Not mandatory NA Not mandatory 
Annual reports audited by 
an independent auditor 
Not mandatory Public companies 
are obliged to 
publicly disclose 
annual financial 
statements audited 
by an independent 
auditor. 
 
Some companies 
are obliged by law 
to have yearly 
auditing by an 
independent auditor 
Source: laws of respective countries 
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Table 7a. The determinants of corporate governance in Russia, OLS, 2006 regressors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 CGI 2006 SPI 2006 TDI 2006 
Largest non-state 
owner share 
-0.694**  1.675*  -0.608***  1.735**  -0.201  0.076  
Largest non-state 
owner share squared 
  -2.035**    -2.028***    -0.236  
Management owner 
share 
 -0.211  0.828  -0.175  0.935  -0.246  -0.132 
Management owner 
share squared 
   -0.880    -1.032    -0.141 
Outside owner share  -0.522  1.276  -0.524**  0.903  -0.129  -0.194 
Outside owner share 
squared 
   -1.668**    -1.310**    0.072 
State ownership 
share 
-1.326*** -1.146*** 1.525 1.559 -1.202*** -1.071*** 1.655** 1.774** -0.373 -0.383 0.466 0.462 
State ownership 
share squared 
  -2.701** -2.690**   -2.731*** -2.910***   -1.012 -1.080 
Minority owners 
combined share 
0.689* 0.903** 0.794** 0.926** 0.638** 0.786*** 0.715*** 0.755*** -0.219 -0.218 -0.232 -0.268 
Loan needed 0.327** 0.335*** 0.210 0.207 0.199* 0.205** 0.078 0.083 -0.064 -0.058 -0.092 -0.079 
Group member 0.123 0.139 0.125 0.170 -0.045 -0.009 -0.044 0.011 0.152 0.113 0.143 0.102 
Empl 201-500 -0.186 -0.186 -0.269 -0.239 -0.064 -0.056 -0.140 -0.109 -0.015 -0.021 -0.029 -0.032 
Empl 501-1000 0.370* 0.363* 0.347* 0.362* 0.219 0.217 0.197 0.216 0.176 0.177 0.177 0.183 
Empl 1000-2000 0.242 0.263 0.233 0.258 0.387** 0.406** 0.371** 0.391** -0.028 -0.038 -0.033 -0.038 
Empl 2000-5000 0.789*** 0.803*** 0.775*** 0.804*** 0.652*** 0.672*** 0.636*** 0.664*** -0.068 -0.082 -0.074 -0.090 
Empl >5000 0.899** 0.801** 0.918*** 0.840** 0.716** 0.685** 0.732*** 0.712*** 0.223 0.214 0.216 0.206 
OAO 0.737*** 0.795*** 0.592*** 0.614*** 0.514*** 0.567*** 0.364*** 0.395*** 0.068 0.068 0.028 0.036 
Listed 0.179 0.216 0.062 0.098 0.046 0.052 -0.072 -0.049 0.067 0.073 0.053 0.068 
Industry fixed 
effects 
+ + + + + + + + + + + + 
Constant 2.148*** 1.967*** 1.749*** 1.692*** 1.839*** 1.695*** 1.462*** 1.497*** 1.804*** 1.819*** 1.813*** 1.893*** 
Observations 389 387 389 387 397 395 397 395 311 309 311 309 
R-squared 0.24 0.23 0.27 0.26 0.22 0.21 0.27 0.26 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
 26
Table 7b. The determinants of corporate governance in Ukraine, OLS, 2006 regressors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 CGI 2006 SPI 2006 TDI 2006 
Largest non-state 
owner share 
0.314  1.173  0.078  1.076**  0.384**  0.212  
Largest non-state 
owner share squared 
  -0.826    -0.937**    0.157  
Management owner 
share 
 0.357  1.698*  0.136  1.079*  0.312  0.386 
Management owner 
share squared 
   -1.675*    -1.109*    -0.151 
Outside owner share  0.351  0.057  0.059  0.206  0.452**  0.116 
Outside owner share 
squared 
   0.353    -0.098    0.348 
State ownership 
share 
0.204 0.256 0.758 1.041 -0.322 -0.316 0.867 0.961 0.290 0.333 -0.304 -0.197 
State ownership 
share squared 
  -0.540 -0.900   -1.310 -1.505   0.698 0.625 
Minority owners 
combined share 
0.835** 0.877*** 0.867*** 0.805** 0.467** 0.465** 0.519** 0.451* 0.477** 0.519*** 0.468** 0.495** 
Loan needed -0.016 -0.021 -0.033 -0.032 0.042 0.045 0.026 0.031 -0.022 -0.033 -0.021 -0.029 
Group member 0.192 0.195 0.194 0.210 -0.033 -0.024 -0.033 -0.015 0.166 0.149 0.167 0.154 
Empl 201-500 -0.015 -0.015 -0.028 -0.022 -0.022 -0.021 -0.045 -0.037 0.030 0.029 0.041 0.039 
Empl 501-1000 0.205 0.214 0.211 0.231 0.187 0.197 0.187 0.204 0.104 0.097 0.108 0.102 
Empl 1000-2000 0.283 0.287 0.295 0.272 0.238 0.243 0.247 0.237 -0.125 -0.132 -0.120 -0.134 
Empl 2000-5000 0.348 0.366 0.354 0.364 0.326 0.343 0.326 0.334 0.191 0.186 0.207 0.191 
Empl >5000 0.469 0.482 0.449 0.435 0.154 0.173 0.047 0.064 0.415* 0.401* 0.467* 0.450 
OAO 0.523*** 0.522*** 0.498*** 0.519*** 0.213** 0.216** 0.182* 0.202** 0.198** 0.184* 0.202** 0.196** 
Listed 0.327* 0.322* 0.320* 0.305* 0.213* 0.209* 0.199* 0.188 0.005 0.005 0.010 0.009 
Industry fixed 
effects 
+ + + + + + + + + + + + 
Constant 2.980*** 2.930*** 2.791*** 2.907*** 2.582*** 2.573*** 2.336*** 2.477*** 1.746*** 1.705*** 1.792*** 1.772*** 
Observations 335 335 335 335 354 354 354 354 328 328 328 328 
R-squared 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
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Table 7c. The determinants of corporate governance in Kyrgyzstan, OLS, 2006 regressors 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 CGI 2006 SPI 2006 TDI 2006 
Largest non-state 
owner share 
0.299  0.501  0.237  0.002  -1.065**  -0.992  
Largest non-state 
owner share squared 
  -0.179    0.260    0.038  
Management owner 
share 
 -1.146  -4.269***  -0.481  -2.632**  -1.609***  -2.548** 
Management owner 
share squared 
   3.998***    2.796**    1.233 
Outside owner share  -0.652  1.492  -0.062  1.383  -1.497**  0.179 
Outside owner share 
squared 
   -2.621**    -1.754*    -1.965* 
State ownership 
share 
-0.621 -1.673** -0.849 -0.552 -0.667 -1.087* -1.639 -1.218 -1.901*** -2.447*** -4.295*** -4.490*** 
State ownership 
share squared 
  0.339 -1.214   1.193 0.311   3.112*** 2.737*** 
Minority owners 
combined share 
1.426 0.424 1.449 0.443 1.181* 0.784 1.202* 0.801 -0.505 -0.998 -0.383 -0.974 
Loan needed 0.046 0.000 0.047 0.060 -0.051 -0.088 -0.050 -0.046 0.078 0.095 0.063 0.063 
Group member -0.095 -0.063 -0.097 -0.259 0.021 0.040 0.039 -0.078 0.223 0.256 0.290 0.257 
Log empl 0.189* 0.197* 0.190* 0.193* 0.109 0.113 0.111 0.108 0.192*** 0.189*** 0.188*** 0.173** 
OAO 1.181*** 1.188*** 1.167*** 1.187*** 1.100*** 1.118*** 1.075*** 1.095*** 0.869*** 0.846*** 0.881*** 0.873*** 
Listed 0.882** 0.715* 0.884** 0.487 0.434* 0.325 0.438* 0.182 0.350 0.303 0.364 0.229 
Constant 1.017 2.086** 0.978 2.121** 0.777 1.210** 0.832 1.271** 1.434*** 1.991*** 1.401** 2.027*** 
Observations 112 112 112 112 116 116 116 116 178 178 178 178 
R-squared 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.39 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.39 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.29 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%      
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Table 8a. The determinants of corporate governance in Russia, OLS, lagged (2005) regressors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 CGI 2006 SPI 2006 TDI 2006 
Largest non-state 
owner share 
-0.281  1.647  -0.366  1.531*  -0.641***  -0.700  
Largest non-state 
owner share squared 
  -1.764*    -1.741**    0.053  
Management owner 
share 
 -0.109  0.935  -0.036  0.767  -0.383  0.009 
Management owner 
share squared 
   -1.102    -0.834    -0.472 
Outside owner share  -0.282  0.562  -0.455*  0.288  -0.549**  -0.504 
Outside owner share 
squared 
   -0.764    -0.683    -0.024 
State ownership 
share 
-0.706 -0.691 1.041 1.124 -0.749* -0.724* 0.673 0.759 -0.811** -0.709* -1.060 -0.828 
State ownership 
share squared 
  -1.679 -1.907   -1.303 -1.554   0.309 0.183 
Minority owners 
combined share 
0.589 0.660 0.596 0.619 0.507* 0.573* 0.519* 0.541* -0.709** -0.635** -0.706** -0.661** 
Loan needed 0.189 0.176 0.151 0.153 -0.012 -0.027 -0.047 -0.046 -0.057 -0.043 -0.055 -0.045 
Group member -0.217 -0.202 -0.182 -0.173 -0.261* -0.208 -0.229 -0.186 0.093 0.151 0.090 0.154 
Empl 201-500 0.021 0.026 0.011 0.029 0.081 0.087 0.072 0.090 0.080 0.046 0.082 0.050 
Empl 501-1000 0.714*** 0.713*** 0.753*** 0.774*** 0.537*** 0.534*** 0.572*** 0.582*** 0.455** 0.432** 0.450** 0.439** 
Empl 1000-2000 0.831*** 0.866*** 0.863*** 0.909*** 0.898*** 0.923*** 0.928*** 0.958*** 0.189 0.115 0.187 0.122 
Empl 2000-5000 1.455*** 1.470*** 1.494*** 1.515*** 1.284*** 1.310*** 1.322*** 1.347*** -0.177 -0.190 -0.176 -0.184 
Empl >5000 1.605*** 1.631*** 1.588*** 1.637*** 1.362*** 1.417*** 1.356*** 1.421*** 0.152 0.105 0.158 0.128 
OAO 0.604*** 0.607*** 0.463** 0.481** 0.434*** 0.466*** 0.301** 0.363** 0.049 0.154 0.059 0.141 
Listed 0.183 0.176 0.160 0.185 -0.141 -0.142 -0.160 -0.135 0.359 0.341 0.360 0.347 
Industry fixed 
effects 
+ + + + + + + + + + + + 
Constant 2.630*** 2.592*** 2.271*** 2.447*** 2.432*** 2.345*** 2.070*** 2.219*** 1.586*** 1.384** 1.588*** 1.366** 
Observations 250 248 250 248 252 250 252 250 209 207 209 207 
R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 8b. The determinants of corporate governance in Ukraine, OLS, lagged (2005) regressors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 CGI 2006 SPI 2006 TDI 2006 
Largest non-state 
owner share 
-0.437  0.610  -0.202  0.937  -0.017  -0.516  
Largest non-state 
owner share squared 
  -1.023    -1.101**    0.506  
Management owner 
share 
 0.229  1.735*  0.302  1.292**  0.075  0.074 
Management owner 
share squared 
   -1.906**    -1.209*    -0.032 
Outside owner share  -0.330  0.157  -0.226  0.231  -0.026  -0.410 
Outside owner share 
squared 
   -0.512    -0.461    0.429 
State ownership 
share 
-0.050 0.146 0.331 0.675 -0.364 -0.277 0.982 1.159 -0.012 0.005 0.317 0.403 
State ownership 
share squared 
  -0.298 -0.578   -1.499 -1.730   -0.483 -0.517 
Minority owners 
combined share 
0.764** 0.879** 0.843** 0.871** 0.591*** 0.623*** 0.695*** 0.657*** -0.049 -0.044 -0.063 -0.055 
Loan needed 0.015 0.030 0.022 0.035 0.003 0.014 0.012 0.024 0.010 0.014 0.009 0.011 
Group member 0.077 0.157 0.087 0.161 -0.156 -0.067 -0.149 -0.070 0.126 0.142 0.119 0.135 
Empl 201-500 0.002 0.014 0.004 0.008 0.040 0.052 0.040 0.045 0.042 0.041 0.033 0.039 
Empl 501-1000 0.280 0.332 0.302 0.350 0.174 0.220 0.201 0.237 0.257* 0.264* 0.246* 0.262* 
Empl 1000-2000 0.765*** 0.814*** 0.763*** 0.805*** 0.516*** 0.564*** 0.526*** 0.570*** -0.106 -0.100 -0.103 -0.091 
Empl 2000-5000 0.288 0.365 0.284 0.379 0.413* 0.494** 0.391* 0.467** 0.013 0.027 -0.021 0.009 
Empl >5000 -0.490 -0.371 -0.553 -0.390 -0.398 -0.314 -0.528 -0.408 0.615** 0.625** 0.621** 0.635** 
OAO 0.308* 0.353** 0.265 0.298* 0.115 0.142 0.052 0.085 0.111 0.115 0.127 0.132 
Listed 0.194 0.234 0.194 0.224 0.030 0.065 0.026 0.060 0.004 0.009 0.013 0.012 
Industry fixed 
effects 
+ + + + + + + + + + + + 
Constant 3.199*** 3.022*** 2.926*** 2.903*** 2.641*** 2.561*** 2.335*** 2.422*** 1.858*** 1.842*** 1.977*** 1.926*** 
Observations 261 261 261 261 275 275 275 275 232 232 232 232 
R-squared 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
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Table 8c. The determinants of corporate governance in Kyrgyzstan, OLS, lagged (2005) regressors 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 CGI 2006 SPI 2006 TDI 2006 
Largest non-state 
owner share 
0.238  2.083  0.448  1.830  -0.043  0.102  
Largest non-state 
owner share squared 
  -1.569    -1.175    -0.132  
Management owner 
share 
 -0.471  -1.205  -0.096  -0.549  -0.560  -0.954 
Management owner 
share squared 
   1.277    0.698    0.322 
Outside owner share  -0.608  2.030  -0.174  1.036  -0.604  -1.136 
Outside owner share 
squared 
   -2.854    -1.327    0.535 
State ownership 
share 
-0.428 -1.177 -0.335 -1.031 -0.396 -0.923 -0.475 -1.164 -0.481 -0.982 -2.855** -3.506*** 
State ownership 
share squared 
  0.480 0.211   0.534 0.448   2.825** 2.827** 
Minority owners 
combined share 
-0.544 -1.231 -0.265 -0.835 0.065 -0.440 0.278 -0.264 -0.429 -0.910 -0.346 -0.891 
Loan needed 0.007 0.002 0.029 0.042 0.052 0.044 0.065 0.052 0.211 0.207 0.170 0.171 
Group member -0.331 -0.371 -0.350 -0.388 -0.121 -0.137 -0.136 -0.150 -0.352 -0.386 -0.307 -0.333 
Log empl 0.056 0.068 0.046 0.058 0.043 0.047 0.036 0.044 0.114* 0.116* 0.120* 0.124* 
OAO 1.169*** 1.168*** 1.123*** 1.143*** 1.071*** 1.083*** 1.032*** 1.067*** 0.782*** 0.785*** 0.792*** 0.816*** 
Listed 1.544*** 1.587*** 1.546*** 1.626*** 0.904*** 0.926*** 0.907*** 0.942*** 0.642*** 0.664*** 0.620*** 0.632*** 
Constant 2.048** 2.681*** 1.624* 2.343*** 1.074 1.549** 0.760 1.422** 0.973 1.457** 0.942 1.553** 
Observations 98 98 98 98 103 103 103 103 164 164 164 164 
R-squared 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.18 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 9a. The determinants of changes in corporate governance in Russia, OLS, 2005 regressors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 CGI 2006 – CGI 2005 SPI 2006 - SPI 2005 TDI 2006 - TDI 2005 
Largest non-state 
owner share 
-0.220  -0.702  -0.377  -0.703**  -0.590  -0.543  
Largest non-state 
owner share change 
  -
0.995*** 
   -0.719**    0.229  
Management owner 
share 
 -0.250  -0.521  -0.290  -0.564**  0.072  -0.134 
Management owner 
share change 
   -0.470    -0.556*    -0.544 
Outside owner share  -0.114  -0.499  -0.339  -0.661**  -0.577*  -0.590 
Outside owner share 
change 
   -0.773*    -0.556*    0.025 
State ownership share -0.204 -0.190 -0.241 -0.160 -0.264 -0.263 -0.202 -0.210 -0.480 -0.203 -0.592 -0.443 
State ownership share 
change 
  0.829 0.819   0.980* 1.060*   0.053 0.079 
Minority owners 
combined share 
-0.345 -0.324 -0.898** -0.733 -0.319 -0.297 -0.765** -0.726** -0.460 -0.222 -0.422 -0.374 
Minority owners share 
change 
  -0.218 -0.069   -0.360 -0.307   -0.117 -0.259 
Loan needed -0.085 -0.073 -0.117 -0.088 -0.073 -0.069 -0.106 -0.105 -0.254* -0.258* -0.249 -0.273* 
Group member -0.317* -0.334* -0.264 -0.253 -0.297* -0.297* -0.295* -0.309* -0.066 0.113 -0.126 0.031 
Empl 201-500 0.125 0.113 0.142 0.134 0.083 0.074 0.116 0.104 -0.070 -0.139 -0.024 -0.090 
Empl 501-1000 0.221 0.215 0.260 0.263 0.177 0.171 0.219 0.217 0.092 -0.025 0.164 0.091 
Empl 1000-2000 0.087 0.067 0.257 0.262 0.293 0.278 0.388** 0.388* 0.088 -0.037 0.267 0.113 
Empl 2000-5000 0.546 0.529 0.689* 0.670* 0.346 0.335 0.453 0.436 -0.135 -0.154 -0.008 -0.061 
Empl >5000 0.769* 0.722* 0.779** 0.626 0.398 0.381 0.437 0.394 -0.480 -0.509 -0.270 -0.358 
OAO 0.379** 0.382** 0.313* 0.355* 0.230* 0.254* 0.146 0.193 0.086 0.370* 0.160 0.412* 
Listed -0.340 -0.331 -0.567 -0.573 -0.135 -0.147 -0.349 -0.368 -0.074 -0.146 0.233 0.089 
Industry fixed effects + + + + + + + + + + + + 
Constant -0.615 -0.617 -0.169 -0.257 -0.036 -0.060 0.287 0.266 -0.011 -0.466 -0.342 -0.645 
Observations 261 259 235 232 268 266 242 239 160 158 143 141 
R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.14 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.17 0.13 0.18 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 9b. The determinants of changes in corporate governance in Ukraine, OLS, 2005 regressors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 CGI 2006 – CGI 2005 SPI 2006 - SPI 2005 TDI 2006 - TDI 2005 
Largest non-state 
owner share 
-0.346  -0.002  0.099  0.308  -0.285  -0.077  
Largest non-state 
owner share change 
  0.426    0.214    0.364  
Management owner 
share 
 -0.036  0.180  0.376  0.551*  -0.427*  -0.249 
Management owner 
share change 
   0.466    0.216    0.039 
Outside owner share  -0.481*  -0.316  -0.051  0.084  -0.278  -0.016 
Outside owner share 
change 
   0.159    0.120    0.422 
State ownership share 0.316 0.268 0.646 0.482 0.361 0.326 0.620** 0.542* -0.416 -0.465 -0.125 -0.145 
State ownership share 
change 
  0.608 0.428   0.366 0.245   0.883 0.872 
Minority owners 
combined share 
0.299 0.242 0.498 0.306 0.359* 0.317* 0.455 0.354 -0.091 -0.125 -0.036 -0.042 
Minority owners share 
change 
  0.181 0.029   0.001 -0.087   0.004 0.014 
Loan needed 0.115 0.125 0.117 0.128 0.077 0.088 0.067 0.087 0.021 0.015 0.056 0.039 
Group member -0.148 -0.094 -0.381 -0.320 0.016 0.089 -0.106 -0.015 -0.550*** -0.587*** -0.564*** -0.581*** 
Empl 201-500 -0.212 -0.213 -0.195 -0.196 0.008 0.001 0.036 0.026 0.024 0.035 -0.005 0.036 
Empl 501-1000 -0.128 -0.118 -0.064 -0.039 -0.070 -0.060 -0.048 -0.030 0.301** 0.292** 0.328** 0.328** 
Empl 1000-2000 -0.105 -0.068 0.021 0.072 0.082 0.114 0.211 0.257 -0.441* -0.448* -0.520** -0.515** 
Empl 2000-5000 0.257 0.302 0.108 0.100 0.003 0.060 -0.023 0.032 0.114 0.081 0.106 0.160 
Empl >5000 -0.493 -0.469 -0.840 -0.786 -0.579** -0.539** -0.765*** -0.711** 0.728** 0.714** 0.660** 0.660** 
OAO 0.333* 0.313 0.362* 0.349* 0.002 0.019 0.016 0.003 0.158 0.165 0.177 0.175 
Listed 0.534** 0.548** 0.717*** 0.713*** 0.105 0.122 0.218 0.229 0.105 0.106 0.106 0.118 
Industry fixed effects + + + + + + + + + + + + 
Constant 0.014 0.060 -0.280 -0.127 -0.326 -0.300 -0.374 -0.326 0.153 0.195 0.033 0.059 
Observations 259 259 209 209 277 277 225 225 215 215 200 200 
R-squared 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 9c. The determinants of changes in corporate governance in Kyrgyzstan, OLS, 2005 regressors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 CGI 2006 – CGI 2005 SPI 2006 - SPI 2005 TDI 2006 - TDI 2005 
Largest non-state 
owner share 
-0.222  1.303  -0.120  0.592  0.151  0.245  
Largest non-state 
owner share change 
  0.020    0.008    0.001  
Management owner 
share 
 0.107  -0.206  -0.348  -0.059  -0.204  -0.702 
Management owner 
share change 
   -0.015    -0.004    -0.006 
Outside owner share  0.131  0.019  -0.278  0.077  -0.636  -0.818 
Outside owner share 
change 
   -0.008    0.001    -0.002 
State ownership share -0.776 -0.480 0.447 -0.756 -0.795 -0.974 -0.268 -0.781 -0.310 -0.814 0.192 -0.766 
State ownership share 
change 
  0.009 -0.018   -0.002 -0.011   0.009 0.003 
Minority owners 
combined share 
-1.312 -1.027 0.426 -0.818 -1.062** -1.250** -0.121 -0.656 0.082 -0.360 0.502 -0.444 
Minority owners share 
change 
  0.022* -0.002   0.013 0.004   0.007 0.001 
Loan needed 0.281 0.279 0.359 0.296 0.227 0.226 0.264 0.234 0.404** 0.410** 0.459** 0.439** 
Group member -0.972** -0.957** -0.897* -0.965* -0.772* -0.797* -0.730 -0.748 -0.288 -0.219 -0.336 -0.225 
Log empl 0.130 0.123 0.195* 0.198* 0.089 0.087 0.133* 0.141* 0.039 0.060 0.013 0.022 
OAO -0.102 -0.080 -0.412 -0.439 0.216 0.226 0.013 -0.013 0.151 0.115 0.112 0.115 
Listed 0.244 0.255 0.143 0.047 -0.035 -0.038 -0.059 -0.115 -0.333 -0.363 -0.421 -0.459* 
Constant -0.075 -0.356 -1.559 -0.236 -0.220 -0.025 -0.928 -0.393 -0.578 -0.184 -0.708 0.177 
Observations 81 81 78 78 86 86 83 83 150 150 139 139 
R-squared 0.14 0.14 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.26 0.26 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.10 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 10. Internal and outside investments in three countries in 2005 
 
Percent of firms 
having: 
Russia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan 
No investments 13.9 28.4 48.3 
Only internal 
investments 
55.2 47.7 37.9 
Outside 
investments 
30.9 23.9 13.8 
Number of 
observations 
776 698 269 
 
Table 10a. The determinants of investment sources in Russia, multinomial logit, 
lagged (2005) regressors 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Only 
internal inv. 
Outside inv. Only 
internal inv. 
Outside inv. 
CGI 0.003 -0.003   
SPI   0.024 -0.024 
Management owner 
share 
0.275 -0.271 0.325 -0.322 
Management owner 
share squared 
-0.421 0.417 -0.485 0.481 
Outside owner share -0.296 0.298 -0.344 0.345 
Outside owner share 
squared 
0.441 -0.441 0.486 -0.486 
State ownership share 2.143*** -2.142*** 2.148*** -2.147*** 
State ownership share 
squared 
-2.294*** 2.293*** -2.319*** 2.318*** 
Minority owners 
combined share 
0.401** -0.401** 0.372** -0.372** 
Loan needed -0.183*** 0.184*** -0.172** 0.172** 
Profitable -0.062 0.062 -0.075 0.075 
Group member -0.066 0.067 -0.069 0.069 
Empl 201-500 -0.146 0.146 -0.109 0.110 
Empl 501-1000 0.024 -0.023 0.049 -0.048 
Empl 1000-2000 -0.282** 0.283** -0.262** 0.263** 
Empl 2000-5000 -0.108 0.116 -0.113 0.121 
Empl >5000 -0.654*** 0.663 -0.647*** 0.655 
OAO -0.013 0.013 -0.018 0.018 
Listed -0.021 0.021 -0.029 0.029 
Industry fixed effects + + + + 
Constant 0.784** -0.778** 0.742** -0.736** 
Observations 279 279 283 283 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Base category in multinomial logit: firms that didn’t invest. 
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Table 10b. The determinants of investment sources in Ukraine, multinomial 
logit, lagged (2005) regressors 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Only 
internal 
inv. 
Outside 
inv. 
Only 
internal 
inv. 
Outside 
inv. 
Only 
internal 
inv. 
Outside 
inv. 
CGI -0.040 0.013     
SPI   -0.004 -0.020   
TDI     -0.001 0.011 
Management owner 
share 
0.382 0.019 0.115 0.281 -0.039 0.121 
Management owner 
share squared 
-0.232 0.129 0.092 -0.203 0.056 -0.068 
Outside owner share -0.249 0.319 -0.133 0.164 -0.261 0.319 
Outside owner share 
squared 
0.324 -0.191 0.185 -0.028 0.168 -0.188 
State ownership 
share 
1.334** -0.793 1.375** -0.922 1.094 -1.016 
State ownership 
share squared 
-1.446* 0.859 -1.433* 0.914 -0.964 0.879 
Minority owners 
combined share 
0.148 -0.125 0.069 -0.038 0.211 -0.209 
Loan needed -0.266*** 0.272*** -0.262*** 0.273*** -0.256*** 0.261*** 
Profitable -0.035 0.124* 0.003 0.079 -0.047 0.067 
Group member 0.104 -0.022 0.092 -0.038 0.059 -0.050 
Empl 201-500 -0.076 0.113 -0.097 0.114 -0.106 0.109 
Empl 501-1000 0.021 0.137 -0.003 0.143 -0.083 0.113 
Empl 1000-2000 0.132 0.029 0.065 0.066 0.030 -0.008 
Empl 2000-5000 0.006 0.086 -0.044 0.132 -0.068 0.085 
Empl >5000 1.784*** 0.989 1.677*** 1.052 0.451* 0.199 
OAO 0.038 0.033 0.027 0.022 -0.034 0.033 
Listed 0.099 0.126 0.099 0.130 0.303** 0.321 
Industry fixed 
effects 
+ + + + + + 
Constant 0.510** -0.626*** 0.378 -0.490** 0.443* -0.500** 
 (0.248) (0.234) (0.259) (0.245) (0.257) (0.254) 
Observations 256 256 264 264 247 247 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
Base category in multinomial logit: firms that didn’t invest. 
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Table 10c. The determinants of investment sources in Kyrgyzstan, multinomial 
logit, lagged (2005) regressors 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Only 
internal 
inv. 
Outside 
inv. 
Only 
internal 
inv. 
Outside 
inv. 
Only 
internal 
inv. 
Outside 
inv. 
CGI 0.031 0.001     
SPI   0.022 -0.045   
TDI     0.018 0.003 
Management owner 
share 
-1.184 -0.129 -1.159 -0.181 -0.393 -0.226 
Management owner 
share squared 
1.324* -0.098 1.252 -0.013 0.298 0.435 
Outside owner share -0.534 -0.262 -0.498 -0.269 -0.212 0.185 
Outside owner share 
squared 
0.372 0.243 0.282 0.300 0.124 -0.016 
State ownership 
share 
-0.627 -0.637* -0.313 -0.600* 0.111 -0.286 
State ownership 
share squared 
0.778 0.569 0.121 0.509 -0.130 0.339 
Minority owners 
combined share 
-0.489 -0.030 -0.510 0.015 -0.429 0.176 
Loan needed 0.144 0.096* 0.135 0.108* 0.021 0.156** 
Profitable 0.185 0.015 0.176 0.026 0.043 0.013 
Group member -0.170 -0.167** -0.156 -0.107 -0.208 0.009 
Log empl -0.026 0.042** -0.023 0.051** 0.008 0.068*** 
OAO -0.013 -0.161*** -0.015 -0.152** -0.031 -0.155** 
Listed -0.376* 0.106** -0.338* 0.119** -0.392** 0.071 
Constant 0.203 -0.116 0.269 -0.098 0.158 -0.558* 
Observations 104 104 107 107 148 148 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Base category in multinomial logit: firms that didn’t invest. 
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Table 11a. Effect of takeover threats on changes in corporate governance in Russia, OLS, 2005 regressors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 CGI 2006 – CGI 2005 SPI 2006 - SPI 2005 TDI 2006 - TDI 2005 
Takeover threat 2005 0.539** 0.533* 0.406 0.384 0.335 0.342 0.188 0.226 0.040 0.039 0.148 -0.022 
Takeover attempt 2006  -0.211 -0.219 -0.194 -0.227 -0.072 -0.063 -0.049 -0.086 0.197 0.211 0.189 0.212 
Greenmail 2006 -0.032 -0.010 -0.037 0.019 -0.110 -0.130 -0.128 -0.185 0.037 -0.077 -0.089 -0.228 
Largest non-state owner share -0.101  -0.220  -0.060  -0.113  -0.897**  -0.911*  
Largest non-state owner share 
change 
  -0.473    -0.327    0.617  
Management owner share  -0.074  0.013  0.054  -0.005  -0.257  -0.317 
Management owner share 
change 
   -0.536    -0.681*    -0.554 
Outside owner share  0.057  -0.005  -0.089  -0.138  -0.939**  -1.036** 
Outside owner share change    0.095    0.094    0.423 
State ownership share -0.498 -0.431 -0.204 -0.094 -0.308 -0.291 0.019 -0.006 -0.612 -0.498 -0.505 -0.532 
State ownership share change   1.015 1.489   1.280 1.709*   0.794 0.787 
Minority owners combined 
share 
-0.239 -0.161 -0.410 -0.196 -0.152 -0.113 -0.316 -0.269 -0.945* -0.629 -1.040* -0.836 
Minority owners share 
change 
  0.099 0.358   -0.353 -0.292   -0.542 -0.525 
Loan needed 0.118 0.120 0.005 0.052 0.044 0.044 -0.043 -0.007 -0.234 -0.230 -0.298 -0.318 
Group member -0.170 -0.178 -0.186 -0.236 -0.299 -0.277 -0.394** -0.458** -0.008 0.082 -0.225 -0.132 
Empl 201-500 -0.041 -0.047 -0.137 -0.133 0.022 0.017 -0.024 -0.029 -0.054 -0.156 -0.053 -0.136 
Empl 501-1000 0.103 0.104 0.120 0.092 0.245 0.240 0.274 0.254 0.214 0.096 0.308 0.170 
Empl 1000-2000 -0.103 -0.102 -0.062 -0.054 0.267 0.265 0.287 0.270 0.002 -0.078 0.116 -0.021 
Empl 2000-5000 1.170** 1.159** 1.072** 1.087** 0.871** 0.889** 0.830** 0.874** -0.120 -0.040 0.187 0.148 
Empl >5000 0.721* 0.686* 0.794** 0.794* 0.489* 0.508* 0.558** 0.694** 0.008 0.019 0.551 0.583 
OAO 0.359 0.359 0.188 0.240 0.334* 0.368* 0.224 0.290 -0.223 0.079 -0.216 0.064 
Listed 0.018 0.050 -0.101 -0.223 0.101 0.096 -0.066 -0.160 -0.511 -0.507 -0.183 -0.509 
Constant -0.241 -0.314 0.123 -0.089 -0.393 -0.451 -0.130 -0.181 0.963* 0.595 0.963 0.804 
Observations 142 141 131 129 146 145 135 133 95 94 88 87 
R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.14 0.09 0.10 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.15 0.20 0.21 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 11b. Effect of takeover threats on changes in corporate governance in Kyrgyzstan, OLS, 2005 regressors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 CGI 2006 – CGI 2005 SPI 2006 - SPI 2005 TDI 2006 - TDI 2005 
Takeover threat 2005 -0.503 -0.440 -0.383 -0.667 -0.038 -0.059 -0.016 -0.107 -0.483 -0.475 -0.446 -0.650* 
Takeover attempt 2006 -0.412 -0.399 -0.561 -0.595* -0.210 -0.215 -0.309 -0.320 -0.443 -0.415 -0.420 -0.365 
Greenmail 2006 -0.138 -0.040 -0.045 -0.012 -0.348 -0.315 -0.286 -0.315 0.833*** 0.989*** 0.975*** 1.162*** 
Largest non-state 
owner share 
0.007  1.843  0.303  1.161  0.078  0.654  
Largest non-state 
owner share change 
  0.025*    0.012    0.005  
Management owner 
share 
 0.727  0.039  0.078  0.378  -0.472  -1.522 
Management owner 
share change 
   -0.018    -0.002    -0.010 
Outside owner share  0.106  -0.303  0.064  0.467  -0.915  -1.728 
Outside owner share 
change 
   -0.009    0.001    -0.007 
State ownership share -0.723 -0.444 0.790 -1.165 -0.579 -0.765 0.097 -0.554 -0.377 -1.095 0.660 -1.575 
State ownership share 
change 
  0.010 -0.026   0.002 -0.009   0.012 -0.002 
Minority owners 
combined share 
  0.023* -0.008   0.013 0.003   0.009 -0.006 
Minority owners share 
change 
-0.958 -0.565 0.856 -0.809 -0.718 -0.889* 0.281 -0.356 -0.068 -0.727 0.600 -1.630 
Loan needed 0.425 0.471 0.478 0.406 0.381* 0.383* 0.399* 0.343 0.376* 0.376* 0.467** 0.424* 
Group member -1.401*** -1.283** -1.167* -1.152* -1.040* -1.041* -0.931 -0.925 0.080 0.137 -0.018 0.137 
Log empl 0.275* 0.331** 0.320** 0.419*** 0.152* 0.154 0.183* 0.199* 0.046 0.068 0.002 0.003 
OAO 0.089 -0.062 -0.288 -0.481 0.366 0.344 0.149 0.137 0.046 0.007 -0.041 -0.016 
Listed 0.065 -0.007 -0.085 -0.273 -0.136 -0.136 -0.186 -0.244 -0.225 -0.262 -0.345 -0.390 
Constant -1.134 -1.680* -2.661 -1.087 -1.057* -0.868 -1.797* -1.172 -0.432 0.168 -0.853 1.292 
Observations 65 65 63 63 67 67 65 65 122 122 113 113 
R-squared 0.20 0.22 0.27 0.30 0.28 0.27 0.33 0.32 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.11 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 39
Table 12a. Effect of changes in corporate governance on changes in takeover threats in Russia, OLS, 2005 regressors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Change in presence of takeover threat from 2005 to 2006 
CGI change 0.071   0.016   -0.040   -0.170   
SPI change  -0.082   -0.080   -0.285   -0.298  
TDI change   0.374   0.435   -6.545***   -5.930*** 
Largest non-state owner 
share 
-0.993 -0.521 -0.685    -1.256 -0.881 29.571    
Largest non-state owner 
share change 
      0.093 -0.040 115.326    
Management owner share    -0.395 -0.146 -1.993**    0.664 1.028 41.344 
Management owner share 
change 
         3.653* 2.846* 45.602 
Outside owner share    1.521 1.867** 1.011    3.711** 3.828** 37.303*** 
Outside owner share 
change 
         2.642 2.358 86.127 
State ownership share -0.354 -0.052  1.275 1.484  0.223 0.481  4.401** 4.235**  
State ownership share 
change 
      3.453 4.292  3.911* 3.617  
Minority owners combined 
share 
-0.585 -0.366 -1.331 1.079 1.191 -0.604 -2.019** -1.974* -3.164 1.965 1.504 45.562 
Minority owners share 
change 
      -4.710*** -4.867*** -44.384 -3.149* -3.356* 2.490*** 
Profitable 0.938** 0.959**  0.926** 1.080***  0.604 0.707  1.017** 1.584**  
Group member 0.536 0.478 0.857 0.418 0.332 0.387 0.545 0.480 -9.803*** 0.919* 0.648 5.436*** 
Empl 201-500 0.390 0.340 -0.203 0.175 0.157 -0.090 0.133 0.175 -48.353 -0.186 -0.217  
Empl 501-1000 0.749 0.726 -0.366 0.921 0.955 0.197 0.990 1.130 -12.228 1.276 1.339** -15.301*** 
Empl 1000-2000 -0.261 -0.248  -0.167 -0.085  0.141 0.272  0.286 0.410  
Empl 2000-5000  0.101   0.091   0.694   0.389  
Empl >5000 -0.929 -0.705  -1.690 -1.452  -0.595 -0.485     
OAO -0.718* -0.610* -0.751 -0.676* -0.613 -0.710 -1.441*** -1.280*** -28.743 -2.154*** -1.851*** -13.693*** 
Listed 1.400** 1.175**  2.232*** 2.012***  1.192* 1.032*  3.574*** 2.777***  
Constant -1.523* -1.867** 0.076 -3.157*** -3.554*** -0.686 -0.798 -1.307 -11.406 -4.948*** -5.469*** -32.333*** 
Observations 127 138 33 126 137 32 117 128 30 105 116 23 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 12b. Effect of changes in corporate governance on changes in takeover threats in Kyrgyzstan, OLS, 2005 regressors 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Change in presence of takeover threat from 2005 to 2006 
CGI change -0.121   -0.126   -0.048   -0.095   
SPI change  -0.250   -0.264   -0.192   -0.299  
TDI change   0.082   0.107   0.183   0.168 
Largest non-state 
owner share 
-1.520 -0.772 -0.977    -5.006** -3.267 -2.943**    
Largest non-state 
owner share change 
      -0.041 -0.027 -0.024    
Management owner 
share 
   -1.485 -1.687 -1.278    -3.428 -2.988 -2.075 
Management owner 
share change 
         -0.010 -0.004 -0.008 
Outside owner share    -1.019 -0.635 -0.181    -3.299 -2.113 -1.305 
Outside owner share 
change 
         -0.013 -0.003 -0.008 
State ownership share -0.588 -0.531 -0.674 -0.667 -1.018 -0.676 -4.842** -4.314* -3.312** -4.060 -4.165 -2.510 
State ownership share 
change 
      -0.048** -0.042* -0.034** -0.029 -0.027 -0.021 
Minority owners 
combined share 
-0.880 -0.401 -0.256 -0.550 -0.494 -0.025 -3.586* -2.536 -2.654* -2.627 -2.242 -1.587 
Minority owners share 
change 
      -0.198** -0.121* -0.041** -0.146 -0.095 -0.026 
Profitable -1.039** -0.991** -0.807*** -0.989** -0.894** -0.739** -1.131** -1.013** -0.772** -1.128** -0.920* -0.728* 
Group member -0.389 -0.592 0.001 -0.493 -0.682 -0.103 -0.338 -0.506 -0.066 -0.358 -0.545 -0.291 
Log empl 0.215 0.090 -0.066 0.129 0.017 -0.129 0.364* 0.154 0.032 0.218 0.095 -0.016 
OAO   0.657   0.893*   0.885*   0.883* 
Constant -0.514 -0.267 -0.427 -0.166 0.435 -0.464 2.163 2.066 0.970 1.848 1.905 0.284 
Observations 55 56 120 55 56 120 54 55 111 54 55 111 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
